The use of agent systems as a means of implementing contract negotiation in e-commerce and e-trading environments has been the focus of considerable recent interest. A widely studied abstract model considers the setting in which a set of agents have some collection of resources shared out between them and attempt to construct a mutually beneficial optimal reallocation of these by trading resources. The simplest such trades are those in which a single agent transfers exactly one resource to another -so-called 'one-resource-ata-time' or 'O-contracts'. In this research note we consider the computational complexity of a number of natural decision problems in this setting.
Introduction
Mechanisms for negotiating allocation of resources within a group of agents form an important body of work within the study of multiagent systems. Typical abstract models derive from game-theoretic perspectives in economics and among the issues that have been addressed are strategies that agents may use to negotiate, e.g. [5, 8, 10] , and protocols for negotiation in agent societies, e.g. [1, 6] .
The scenario we are concerned with is encapsulated in the following definition. Starting from some initial allocation -P ¼ -individual agents negotiate in an attempt to improve the utility of their holding. A number of interpretations have been proposed in order to define what constitutes a 'sensible' transfer of resource from both an individual agent's viewpoint and from the perspective of the overall allocation. Thus in negotiating a change from an allocation P i to Q i (with P i Q i Ê and P i Q i ) there are three possible outcomes for the agent A i : u i´Pi µ u i´Qi µ, i.e. A i values the allocation Q i as superior to P i ; u i´Pi µ u i´Qi µ, i.e. A i is indifferent between P i and Q i ; and u i´Pi µ u i´Qi µ, i.e. A i is worse off after the exchange. In a setting where agents are seen as self-interested, in order for an agent to accept an exchange with the last outcome, the notion of a pay-off function is used, i.e. in order to accept the new allocation, A i receives some payment sufficient to compensate for the resulting loss in utility. Of course such compensation must be made by other agents in the system who in providing it do not wish to pay in excess of any gain in resource. In defining notions of 'pay-off' the interpretation is that in any transaction each agent A i makes a payment, i : if i ¼ then A i is given i in return for accepting a contract; if i ¼ then A i contributes i to the amount to be distributed among those agents whose pay-off is negative. Formally, such a notion of 'sensible transfer' is captured by the concept of individual rationality.
Definition 1 Let

Definition 2 Let
and Ê be as in Definition 1. A deal is a pair P Q where P P ½ P n and Q Q ½ Q n are distinct partitions of Ê. The effect of implementing the deal P Q is that the allocation of resources specified by P is replaced with that specified by Q. Definition 2 captures one view of a deal being 'sensible' with respect to the perspective of single agents. We require also concepts of 'global' optimality. We consider two commonly used versions of this: Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare.
A deal P Q is said to be individually rational (IR) if there is a
Definition 3
Let P be an allocation of Ê among . The social welfare resulting from P, denoted ´Pµ, is given by
The allocation P is Pareto optimal if for all allocations Q differing from P, it holds
Thus a Pareto optimal allocation is one in which no agent can attain better than its current utility except at the cost of leaving some agent worse off.
A result linking social welfare and individual rationality, which we make frequent use of subsequently, is given in recent work of Endriss et al. [ 
4, Lemma 1]
Fact 4 A deal P Q is IR if and only if ´Qµ ´Pµ.
In a typical application it is unlikely that an initial allocation P ¼ to will either maximise social welfare or be Pareto optimal, thus the agents involved seek to find a sequence of deals that will terminate in an optimal allocation. Given the setting it is clearly the case that there are allocations P opt and Q opt with the properties that ´P opt µ maximises social welfare and for which Q opt is Pareto optimal -of course, P opt and Q opt may not be unique. If the object is to maximise social welfare then clearly the deal P ¼ P opt will achieve this in a single round. It is unreasonable, however, to view such a deal as a viable solution: although always IR (if it represents a strict increase of social welfare) it is questionable whether it could be identified as the first and only deal required. The total number of possible allocations is n m , and so for moderately large numbers of resources (m) there are too many feasibly to enumerate (even when n ¾). In addition it may not be possible to implement the optimising contract in a single transaction even if only two agents are involved: the environment in which the trading process is implemented may not be suited to handling transactions in which large numbers of resources are involved; similarly the protocol used for negotiation and contract description may not allow arbitrarily large numbers of resources to be dealt with.
In order to develop a realistic framework for negotiation, Sandholm [9] We say P Q is a one contract (O-contract) if P Q is a C-contract in which Sthe set of resources transferred -contains exactly one element.
We recall, from Fact 4, that an X-contract P Q (for X ¾ O C ) will be IR if and only if ´Qµ ´Pµ. The main result of this article is that IRO is NP-hard: thus given two distinct allocations there are unlikely to be efficient algorithms determining if one can be reached from the other through a sequence of IR O-contracts.
The next section of this article presents these results with conclusions and open questions raised in the final section.
Complexity Results
Before proceeding with our results we describe our representation for typical instances of IRO. The key issue here concerns the collection of utility functions Í and how these should be encoded. A form in which the value attached to each subset of Ê is explicitly provided will result in an instance occupying space exponential in Ê and would not be considered reasonable in practice. On the other hand, using some encoding of Í as a set of Turing machine programs, Å say, it becomes necessary to assume certain properties in interpreting their computational behaviour, e.g. that the value of u i´S µ as returned by the program M i is defined from the content of M i 's tape after exactly some specified number of moves such as Ê since without such it would not be possible to establish membership in NP (or, indeed, any other complexity class). We represent each member of Í in a manner that does not require explicit enumeration of each subset of Ê, uses a 'program' form whose syntactic correctness can be efficiently verified and for which termination in time linear in the program length is guaranteed. The class of programs employed are the so-called straight-line programs which have a natural correspondence with combinational logic networks [2] . Although often considered as a model of parallel computation,´m sµ-combinational networks yield a simple form of sequential program -straight-line programs -as follows. Let C be an´m sµ-combinational network to be transformed to a straightline program, SLP´Cµ, that will contain exactly m · C lines. Since C is directed and acyclic it may be topologically sorted, i.e. each gate, g, given a unique integer label, ´gµ with ½ ´gµ C so that if g h is an edge of C then ´gµ ´hµ. Question: Is the allocation P Pareto optimal?
Definition 8 An´m sµ-combinational
Kraus [5, p. 43 ] proves NP-hardness of a weaker form of the problem WO whereby in addition to the total social welfare having to attain some specified value the allocation must be such that each agent accrues some designated guaranteed utility.
Theorem 10 Even if n (the number of agents) is ¾ and the utility functions are monotonic, i.e. u´Sµ u´Rµ whenever R S, a) WI is NP-complete.
¾ Although this definition assumes utility functions to have non-negative values, were it the case that some function with u´Sµ ¼ was to be represented we can achieve this by using an additional output bit, t ¦ to flag whether val´C´«µµ should be treated as positive
Proof: We first demonstrate that the three problems are in the classes stated, recalling that the utility functions Í are encoded by´m s i µ-combinational networks For part (a) we use a reduction from 3-SAT, instances of which are propositional formulae¨´X n µ in conjunctive normal form with each clause of¨defined by exactly three literals. We further restrict instances to formulae that contain exactly n clauses, a variant shown to be NP-complete 
be an instance of this problem, where y i j is some literal x k or x k .
Given¨´X n µ we construct an instance
We say that a subset S of Ê is useful if the set 2. The instantiation by which each y ¾ Lits´Sµ is assigned true is a satisfying assignment of¨´X n µ.
For utility functions we use,
Both of these function are monotonic in the sense given by the theorem statement.
Furthermore given¨´X n µ we may construct the combinational networks C´½ µ and C´¾ µ as follows. Let the inputs for each network be z ½ z ¿n with z i set to represent the presence of x i (if i n), the presence of x i n (if n i ¾n) and the presence of C i ¾n if (¾n i ¿n).
For C´½ µ we simply use a combinational network that computes the binary repre-
Here, z i j is the variable from z ½ z ¾n corresponding to the literal y i j of clause C i .
The summation to compute the binary representation of the number of bits set to ½ within Z ¿n can be carried out using the using the schema of Muller and Preparata [7] , see e.g. [2, pp. 112-4] . The whole number val´C ½´« S µµ computed will be S , i.e. the number of variables set to ½ in « S , if S is empty or not useful; and S · ½ if S is useful.
For C´¾ µ , a combinational network computes the binary representation of
It is clearly the case that these descriptions can be constructed in polynomial-time from the formula¨´X n µ. Now, noting that ´ Ê µ ¾, we claim that there is an allocation, Q, having ´Qµ ¾ if and only if¨´X n µ is satisfiable. To see this consider any non-empty S Ê and the allocation S Ê S to A ½ A ¾ . We have,
In the former case we get, ´ S Ê S µ ¾ · ½ ´¿nµ and, in the latter, ´ S Ê S µ ¾ ½ ´¿nµ. Thus the allocation Ê is welfare improvable if and only if there is an allocation S to A ½ that is useful: a condition that requires Lits´Sµ to induce a satisfying instantiation of¨´X n µ, completing the proof that WI is NP-hard.
For part (b) we simply form the instance,
as in part (a) and K ¾ · ½ ´¿nµ.
Finally for part (c), we use Ê and u ½ u ¾ as previously, but set P P ½ P ¾ C ½ C n x ½ x n x ½ x n . In this case we have u ½´P½ µ ½ ¿ and u ¾´P¾ µ ½ ·´¾n ½µ ´¿nµ, so that ´Pµ ¾ ½ ´¿nµ. We claim that this allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if¨´X n µ is unsatisfiable. First suppose¨´X n µ is unsatisfiable. Certainly for any allocation Q S Ê S differing from P ½ P ¾ , it must be the case that S or S is not useful. In the former case,
so that the Pareto Optimality condition of Definition 3(1) holds for P ½ P ¾ with respect to
If S is non-empty then
and so does not increase social welfare. It follows that, in this case,
Hence if¨´X n µ is unsatisfiable then P is Pareto optimal. On the other hand supposë´X n µ is satisfiable. We can then demonstrate that P is not Pareto optimal by considering any set of literals y ½ y n whose instantiation to true satisfies¨. With such a set consider the allocation
Certainly Q ½ is useful, therefore
We deduce that the allocation P is Pareto optimal if and only if¨´X n µ is unsatisfiable. ¿ The algorithm -guess a sequence of O-contracts realising P s P t and check whether this defines an IR contract path -may fail to be realisable by an NP computation. Even when such a sequence exists, [9, Propn. 2] gives an upper bound on its length which is exponential in Ê . In the absence of a polynomial upper bound it is unclear whether membership in NP can be established.
We construct an instance T¨ Ê Í P s P t of IRO which is accepted if and only if¨´X n µ is satisfiable. Furthermore ¾ for this instance.
Given¨´X n µ, the set of agents in T¨contains two members which we denote by A eval and A coll . The set, Ê, of resources allocated between these is,
i.e. the m clauses of¨´X n µ together with the ¾n literals over X n . The source and destination allocations, P s and P t , are
It remains to define the utility functions u eval and u coll for each agent. Y eval is either undefined or fails to satisfy¨´X n µ.
We observe that suitable combinational networks can be constructed efficiently from¨´X n µ in a manner similar to that used in the proof of Theorem 10.
We claim that¨´X n µ is satisfiable if and only if there is an IR O-contract path realising the deal
First suppose that¨´X n µ is satisfiable and let y ½ y n be a set of literals the instantiation of each to true satisfies¨´X n µ. Consider the following sequence of O-contracts in which, to start, i ½. x n x ½ x n and C coll will equal C ½ C m , i.e. the allocation described by P t in the instance. We claim that every O-contract in the sequence described above is IR for which it suffices, from Fact 4, to show that each results in a strict increase in social welfare.
Consider the value of ´P s µ. Noting the convention that an empty set of clauses is always satisfied, i.e. equivalent to the Boolean value true,
We first note that the first iteration through steps (1) and (2) -the transfer of y ½ followed by the satisfied clauses -results in increased social welfare. 
We have shown already that ´ P ½ 
After the O-contract transferring y i·½ to P To complete the first part part of the proof, we note that
The concluding sequence of O-contracts transfers each of the literals y i to A eval : since C eval each such transfer adds ½ ´¾n · mµ to the current utility enjoyed by A eval without changing the value of u coll . Thus the final sequence of O-contracts is IR.
It follows that if¨´X n µ is satisfiable then the instance T¨of IRO defined above is accepted.
On the other hand suppose that there is an IR O-contract path realising P s P t . We need to show, in this case, that¨´X n µ is satisfiable.
Consider any IR O-contract path, T realising the deal P s P t , with T ¼ P s and
We claim that for each i (with ½ i r) the IR O-contract T i ½ T i satisfies the following properties:
We call the former a literal transfer and the latter a clause transfer. 
We establish this claim by induction on i. For the inductive base, i ½, we have The inequality in the second line is needed because this deal would further decrease social welfare if the literal transferred was needed to satisfy some clause in C i coll .
C i eval
then were it the case that y ¾ Y i eval we would get 
and T i T i·½ would not be IR. We note the need for condition c2 in defining u coll here: if C eval C and Y eval constitutes a well-defined satisfying instantiation of C ½ C m C but not of¨´X n µ then using only (c1) and (c3) to define u coll would allow the clause transfer of C to be IR even though the resulting allocation does not yield a satisfying instantiation. We note that Ê ¿n so our bound on cluster size allows at most n elements from Ê to feature in a single deal. If¨´X n µ is satisfiable then we have already seen that an IR O-contract is possible. The reverse implication is immediate from the following claim which can be established in a manner similar to the corresponding result in the proof of Theorem 11.
If T is a IR kC-contract path realising the deal P s P t , with T ¼ P s and T r P t , 
Conclusion
We have considered a number of decision problems that naturally arise from the multiagent contract negotiation models promoted by (among others) [4, 9] . In summary, if contracts are restricted to those in which a limited number of resources can be transferred from one agent to another and are required to be rational (in the sense of strictly improving overall worth of an allocation), then not only is it the case that a suitable contract-path to an optimal allocation may fail to exist (as already shown in [9] ), but even deciding if a path from a given allocation to a specified more beneficial allocation is possible, is intractable. There are a number of directions in which the results above could be developed. The requirement for individuals deals in a contract-path to be IR could be relaxed so that a limited number of 'irrational' deals are permitted, provided that the allocation eventually reached improves upon the initial allocation. Alternatively, we could consider contracts in which deals permitting an exchange of resources between two agents are allowed -the so-called swop or S-contracts of [9] . We conjecture, however, that even these degrees of freedom will continue to yield decision questions that are intractable.
